Tuesday, January 24, 2012

50-man Space Base crew (1970)

When Thomas O. Paine became Acting Administrator of NASA following the October 1968 resignation of James Webb, he had seven months of Federal job experience. After Richard Nixon was sworn in as President in January 1969, Paine became a Democrat in a Republican Administration. He submitted his resignation pro forma, but the Nixon White House asked him to stay on.

Paine's political position was pitifully weak and, even if they did not vocalize it, savvy observers must have seen his retention as a commentary on the Nixon Administration's enthusiasm for space. Some have portrayed him as a patsy Nixon sought to keep in place in the event that the Kennedy/Johnson Apollo moon program failed.

Paine, however, behaved as though he had the new president's unstinting support. Hoping to build on the anticipated success of the first Apollo moon landing, he pushed for an ambitious new post-Apollo space program. Though told by Nixon's Office of Management and Budget that NASA's budget would be capped at $3.5 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 1971, he stubbornly requested $4.5 billion. He stated publicly that he would seek a $5.5-billion NASA budget in FY 1974.

Despite clear signals from the Nixon White House that grand space plans would not find support, Paine urged his center directors to "think big." Among his goals was a 12-man space station by 1975 that would lead to a $10-billion station with a crew of 100 by 1980 (images above). His big space station, known as the Space Base, was a key component of NASA's Integrated Program Plan, which also called for upgraded Saturn V rockets, a fleet of reusable winged Earth-to-Orbit Shuttles, a fleet of nuclear-powered cislunar Shuttles, a moon-orbiting space station, a lunar surface base, and, by 1986, a manned mission to Mars.

A January 1970 paper by NASA Marshall Space Flight Center engineer Georg von Tiesenhausen captured the flavor of space planning under Paine. In it, von Tiesenhausen attempted "to establish a baseline social and functional structure for a 50-man Space Base" in order to avoid "problems pertaining to organization, population structure, and discipline."

Von Tiesenhausen split the all-male Space Base population into three groups. The Base Command and Management Group would include seven men: the Space Base Commander, the Deputy Commander for Operations, and the Deputy Commander for Science. The Deputy Commander for Operations, the Space Commander's first deputy, would have under him four directors; these would oversee logistics, communications, maintenance, and personnel. The Deputy Commander for Science would be third in the Space Base chain of command.

Eighteen men in three subgroups would make up the Base Operations Group. Subgroup 1, with six men, would tend to Space Base communications, navigation, and data handling functions. The eight men of Subgroup 2 would take care of Space Base power, central computer, life support, and general maintenance functions. Subgroup 3 would include two flight controllers and two medical doctors.

The Deputy Commander for Science would oversee a Scientific Faculty of 25 men. This would include eight Ph.D. scientists, 11 scientific assistants, three technicians, and three "others" arrayed in three discipline subgroups. Subgroup 1, with eight men, would study astronomy, physics, and materials science; Subgroup 2, also with eight men, would focus on biological sciences; and Subgroup 3, with nine men, would take in Earth resources observation and miscellaneous disciplines. Von Tiesenhausen expected that the Scientific Faculty would include mainly men who were not professional astronauts.

He then organized his Space Base crew into three shifts. The day shift, with 21 men, would be headed up by the Space Base Commander. The Deputy Commander for Operations would head up 17 men in shift 2, and the Deputy Commander for Science would supervise 12 men in shift 3. This shift pattern would be followed six days out of seven. The seventh day, a "rest day," would see minimal staffing (five men per shift). Scientific Faculty members would also plan their schedules to accommodate observation and experiment opportunities.

With his crew structure and schedule serving as a point of departure, von Tiesenhausen apportioned territories within the Space Base to the various groups and subgroups. His cardinal rule was that "activities with close relationships and interfaces. . . be located within specific segments of the Base, thus requiring a minimum of traffic."

Three rotating artificial-gravity modules would each serve as a segment, and the "rotating hub" of the Space Base, where the arms supporting the artificial-gravity modules would meet, would divide the zero-gravity center section into two segments. Von Tiesenhausen designated the center segments C1 and C2 and the rotating module segments R1, R2, and R3. The former would provide 4500 square feet of living and working space, while the latter would provide 5900 square feet.

C1 would contain the "docking and supply terminal" for arriving spacecraft, science labs, and half of the Command and Management area. The smaller C2 zone would include half of the Command and Management area and Base Operations. C2 was positioned so that a passageway leading from Base Operations could provide direct access to the Space Base nuclear reactor.

R1 would contain "subsystems," while R2 would provide living quarters for the Command and Management Group and Base Operations Group. The Scientific Faculty would live in R3, but would have duplicate quarters in C1 so that they could remain close to their experiments. Von Tiesenhausen contended that this arrangement could also mitigate "the possible ill effects of alternating between the weightless state and the artificial weight state," which, he wrote, might "be most pronounced with untrained scientists."

The rotating and center sections would each include a sickbay and a "document center." The center section would also include a 20-man dining room, a 20-man assembly hall, and three toilets with showers. All three artificial-gravity modules would include a toilet with shower, and R2 and R3 would each include a 10-man dining room and a 10-man assembly hall.

Even as von Tiesenhausen's paper saw print, the Nixon Administration unveiled its FY 1971 Federal budget. NASA's eventual portion was $3.38 billion, down from $3.75 billion in FY 1970. In the January 1970 press conference on the FY 1971 NASA budget, Paine announced that the Saturn V production line, on standby since 1968, would be permanently closed. Nixon accepted Paine's resignation in July 1970.
Fifty-Man Space Base Population Organization, NASA Technical Memorandum X-53989, Georg von Tiesenhausen, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, January 31, 1970.

3 comments:

  1. Madness!
    These people have killed The American space program!
    A 50 or 100 men space station!
    moon-orbiting space station! and the damned manned mission to Mars!!
    If they went to Nixon asking for a full reusable Shuttle a substenible heavy lift booster and a space station of the ISS size,is probable that were obtained something more that our STS program.

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  2. I agree with you. Paine caused a lot of damage at a time when great care was needed. He did something similar in 1985-1986 in the NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE report. Many space buffs loved his bold "vision," but Congress and Reagan were looking for something realistic, so we got - well, less than nothing. The Ride Report of 1987 was, for my money, the most realistic "vision" of the past 40 years. Basically, she sought to do what Paine had been charged to do, but didn't.

    David

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  3. A bit late... originally Paine was not to chair the 1985 commission. George Low was, and he was the exact opposite of Paine: a cold headed pragmatic. Alas, skin cancer killed him too early. We will never know what the National Commission on Space would have resulted, with him at the chair.

    George Low was truly a fascinating person, very obscure and secretive, but as important as a Von Braun or a Webb.

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